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In the

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1949.

CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, *Petitioner*,

vs.

CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, AND JOSEPH B. FLEMING AND AARON COLNON, Trustees of the Estate of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, *Respondents*.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH CIRCUIT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT.

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INDEX.

PAGE

Petition for writ of certiorari 1
Opinions below 2
Jurisdiction 3
Summary statement 3
Questions presented 6
Reasons for granting the writ 8
Prayer 12

Brief in support of petition for writ of certiorari 13
Statement of case 13
Specification of errors to be urged 14
Summary of argument 15
I. Plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence was insufficient to destroy the presumption of due care, compliance with law and love of life of the deceased transport driver 15
II. Plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove the allegations of negligence made in the complaint 16
III. The Court of Appeals was in error in failing to decide this case under the controlling Kansas authorities 19

Appendix 21

PAGE

Cases Cited.

Canestro v. Joplin-Pittsburg Rld. Co., 135 Kan. 337, 10 P. (2d) 902 16

Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R. Co., et al. v. Consumers Cooperative Association, 180 F. (2d) 900 2

Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Hinds, 56 Kan. 758, 44 Pac. 993 15

Eidson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 85 Kan. 329, 116 Pac. 485 15

Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 ..... 2, 11, 19

Goodloe v. Jo-Mar Dairies Co., 163 Kan. 611, 185 P. (2d) 158 16

Henderson v. National Mutual Casualty Co., 164 Kan. 109, 187 P. (2d) 508 15

Kansas City-Leavenworth R. Co. v. Gallagher, 68 Kan. 424, 75 Pac. 469, 64 L. R. A. 344 15

Lavendar v. Kurn, 327 U. S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916 ..... 6, 7, 11

Looney v. Metropolitan R. Co., et al., 200 U. S. 480, 26 S. Ct. 303, 50 L. Ed. 564 ..... 7, 9

Lukens v. Kellogg, 127 Kan. 568, 274 Pac. 225 18

Miller v. Gabbert, 154 Kan. 260, 118 P. (2d) 523 ..... 16, 18

Smith v. Bassett, 159 Kan. 128, 152 P. (2d) 794 15

Statutes Cited.

Sec. 8-566, 1947 Supplement to the General Statutes of Kansas, 1935 ..... 3, 17

Rule XXI of the State Fire Marshal of Kansas 4, 17

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH CIRCUIT, AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT.

No. .....

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH CIRCUIT.

To the Honorable Fred M. Vinson, Chief Justice of the United States, and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:

Your petitioner, Consumers Cooperative Association of Phillipsburg, Kansas, respectfully presents this peti-

tion for review on writ of certiorari of the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, rendered March 20, 1950, in the cases of Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company, and Joseph B. Fleming, and Aaron Colnon, Trustees of the Estate of The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, appellants and cross-appellees, v. Consumers Cooperative Association, appellee and cross-appellant, Nos. 3965 and 3966, 180 F. (2d) 900. (133-145.)

Opinions Below.

The sole issues before the Court of Appeals was the submissibility of the cases made by the parties in the District Court, where directed verdicts were entered against the plaintiffs and against the defendant on its counterclaim (99-105). It is our belief that in ruling the issues the Court of Appeals failed to follow the controlling substantive law of Kansas which governed the rights of all of the parties to the action. The Honorable Walter A. Huxman, Judge of the Tenth Circuit, long a distinguished practicing attorney at Hutchinson, Kansas, before his elevation to the Bench, and thoroughly versed in the laws and decisions of that state, filed a dissenting opinion in the cause (141-145) which lends weight to our contention that the Court of Appeals failed to follow the controlling law of the State of Kansas. Therefore, among our grounds for applying for review on writ of certiorari are the identical grounds on which the writ was allowed in *Erie R. Co.* v. *Tompkins,* 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188.

Jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, on writ of certiorari is invoked under 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 1254, and Rule 38 of the Supreme Court of the United States effective February 27, 1939. The opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed March 20, 1950 (133-145). Defendant's petition for rehearing was denied April 14, 1950 (159). This petition for review on writ of certiorari is filed within ninety days of March 20, 1950, and is therefore timely. 28 U. S. C. A., Sec. 2101.

Summary Statement.

Respondents here were plaintiffs in the District Court, and your petitioner was defendant there. We believe it will simplify our statement if we refer to the parties as they appeared in that Court.

The complaint (4-18) invoked jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship the defendant being a citizen of Kansas and the plaintiffs all being noncitizens of that state. It is alleged that plaintiffs' high speed Diesel-motored train No. 7, known as the Rocky Mountain Rocket, running between Chicago and Denver, collided with a gasoline transport truck of the defendant at the grade crossing of plaintiffs' tracks with Highway No. 383 at a point about 7 miles west and south of Norton, Kansas. The train was traveling west, the truck proceeding in a southerly direction. The complaint alleges specific negligence of the defendant in driving its transport truck upon plaintiffs' track when train No. 7 was immediately approaching at a speed of 60 to 65 miles an hour and when the train was so close to the crossing that it could not be stopped or its speed reduced to avoid a collision; that the defendant violated Sec. 8-566,

1947 Supplement of the General Statutes of Kansas, 1935 (see Appendix) which requires that vehicles carrying inflammable liquids shall stop within 50 feet but less than 10 feet from the nearest rail of any railroad before crossing the same; that defendant violated Rule XXI promulgated by the State Fire Marshal of the State of Kansas (see Appendix) which requires every vehicle transporting inflammable liquids to be brought to a complete stop immediately before crossing any railroad track and not to proceed thereover until it is safe to do so; that plaintiffs' locomotive was equipped with headlights visible for a great distance and that defendant failed to look for such headlights; that if the driver of the transport had kept a lookout he would have seen the headlights when the train was approaching near the crossing; that the driver could and should have heard the blast of the whistle of the train before it reached the crossing; that if the driver stopped before entering upon the track, he was negligent in proceeding upon it in front of the approaching train.

The complaint further alleges that the transport was carrying 3,000 gallons of gasoline and 1,300 gallons of distillate; that a fire resulted from the collision which did substantial damage to the train; that the engineer and fireman of the train were instantly killed and that the driver of the gasoline transport was instantly killed.

Defendant filed an answer and counterclaim (19-21) in which it admitted the collision and charged that the railroad was guilty of negligence in operating its train at a dangerous and reckless rate of speed under the conditions existing; that it failed to maintain a reasonably sufficient lookout and that it failed to have the train under any or reasonable control.

Plaintiffs asked for damages of $227,488.15 to their train. Defendant's counterclaim asked for damages of $20,000.00 to its transport and contents.

No eyewitnesses to the collision testified at the trial. Plaintiffs' witnesses testified that the headlights of the train were burning before the collision, that they could be seen for a considerable distance and that the whistles on the train were being sounded, and that these could be heard for a considerable distance (44-96). Plaintiffs' proof showed that defendant's transport was cut in two by the collision (64, 65, 76). Please see defendant's Exhibit B (129). Plaintiffs' conductor and brakemen (62, 70, 75) testified that they felt the brakes on the train applied about 3 to 5 seconds before the collision. Plaintiffs' tracks run in a straight line for 1,941 feet east of the crossing and then swing to the northeast. Please see plaintiffs' Exhibit 1 (107). The required speed of plaintiffs' Rocket trains east of the curve shown in the exhibit is 75 miles an hour, 60 miles an hour in the curves and 85 miles an hour in the straightaway approaching and over the crossing. The train was 24 minutes late when it left Norton 7 miles to the east (57, 58, 60, 67). The collision occurred at 3:34 A. M. (62). In answer to interrogatories plaintiffs stated that the engineer and fireman of the train had a clear view of the crossing at night with the engine headlight of 800 to 1,000 feet (83). At a speed of 80 miles an hour stopping distance of the train was one mile (83).

At the close of plaintiffs' case the trial court sustained defendant's motion for directed verdict on the ground that the circumstantial evidence upon which plaintiffs relied to prove defendant's negligence did not overcome the presumptions of due care, compliance with law and love of life of the driver of the transport truck (99-101). Defendant then asked for leave to dismiss its counterclaim without prejudice and was denied such right. Defendant then announced it would stand on the record as

made by the plaintiffs (103). The Court then directed a verdict against the defendant on its counterclaim (103-104).

Motions for new trial were filed by the parties and were by the trial court overruled (35-38). Plaintiffs and defendant filed separate notices of appeal (41, 42). The case was fully briefed and argued in the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Two opinions were filed in the case on March 20, 1950, the majority opinion by Judge Bratton in which Judge Murrah concurred, 180 F. (2d), 902-906 (133-140), and a dissent by Judge Huxman, 180 F. (2d) 906-908 (141-145). The majority opinion ruled that the trial court erroneously sustained defendant's motion for directed verdict, holding that under *Lavendar* v. *Kurn*, 327 U. S. 645, the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs tended to establish probative facts and circumstances from which a jury could draw the reasonable deduction that the driver of the motor transport was negligent and that his negligence was the proximate case of the collision. In his dissent Judge Huxman held that the circumstantial evidence on which plaintiffs relied was not sufficient, under controlling Kansas authorities cited by him, to overcome the presumption that the deceased driver of the transport exercised due care. In each of the opinions the trial court's ruling on plaintiffs' motion for directed verdict against defendant's counterclaim was affirmed.

Questions Presented.

I.

Was plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence of sufficient probative force to overcome the presumption of love of life, compliance with law and the exercise of due care by the deceased gasoline transport driver under the controlling Kansas authorities?

II.

Was plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence of sufficient probative force to overcome the presumption of love of life, compliance with law and the exercise of due care by the deceased gasoline transport driver under the holding of this Court in *Lavendar* v. *Kurn*, 327 U. S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 740, 90 L. Ed. 916?

III.

Where Federal jurisdiction exists solely because of diversity of citizenship, are not the Federal Courts under an absolute duty to follow controlling State authorities?

IV.

Did the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit follow or contravene the controlling authorities of Kansas in arriving at the majority opinion?

V.

Does not the opinion filed contravene the ruling of this Court in *Looney* v. *Metropolitan Railroad Co., et al.*, 200 U. S. 480, 26 S. Ct. 303, 50 L. Ed. 564, which holds that direct evidence is necessary to overcome the presumption of due care and performance of duty and that one presumption cannot be built upon another?

VI.

Does not the majority opinion filed build presumption upon presumption and inference upon inference in order to reach the conclusions made?

Reason for Granting the Writ.

I.

The majority opinion correctly states the applicable controlling law of Kansas, as follows:

> "The Supreme Court of Kansas has held without deviation that ordinarily it will be presumed that a deceased person exercised reasonable care for his safety. The presumption rests upon the instinct of self-preservation. Its source is the premise that the love of life common to all prompts a person to exercise such care as the circumstances permit to protect himself from injury or death. *Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.* v. *Hinds,* 56 Kan. 758, 44 Pac. 993; *Kansas City-Leavenworth Railroad Co.* v. *Gallagher,* 68 Kan. 424, 75 Pac. 469; *Eidson* v. *Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.,* 85 Kan. 329, 116 Pac. 485; *Smith* v. *Bassett,* 159 Kan. 128, 152 Pac. (2d) 794; *Henderson* v. *National Mutual Casualty Co.,* 164 Kan. 109, 187 Pac. (2d) 508. And in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, it will be presumed that a person about to cross a railroad track both looked and listened before venturing to do so. *Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.* v. *Hinds, supra; Kansas City-Leavenworth Railroad Co.* v. *Gallagher, supra.* But the presumption is a rebuttable one which may be overcome by direct or circumstantial evidence sufficiently strong for that purpose." (138.)

In ruling that plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence was sufficient to overcome the presumption of due care of the deceased driver of the gasoline transport, the opinion conflicts with the controlling Kansas authorities as pointed out in the dissent, wherein Judge Huxman said:

> "In case number 3965, the Rock Island was the plaintiff. It charged Consumers Cooperative Associa-

tion with negligence in driving its truck across a railroad crossing. In effect, it charged the driver with negligence in the operation of the truck in crossing the tracks. At the outset, the Railroad Company was faced with the necessity of overcoming by evidence a prima facie case of due care on the part of the driver in operating the transport truck. The only question on this appeal is whether the Rock Island introduced probative evidence, direct or circumstantial, of sufficient weight, which, if believed by the jury, would overthrow the prima facie case of the exercise of due care by the driver of the truck.

"As it was pointed out, it is conceded that the ground was level; that the train approaching the crossing with the headlight burning, which could be seen at a great distance; and that the train was travelling at a speed of approximately 65 miles per hour.

"My associates are of the view that this constitutes sufficient evidence to take the question of due care on the driver's part to the jury. With this, I cannot agree. The legal presumption that the deceased driver exercised due care implies that he looked, saw the approaching train, and had sufficient time to cross otherwise there could be no presumption that he exercised due care in attempting to cross the tracks. To me it seems simple logic that the existence of facts which gives rise to a presumption that the deceased exercised due care in attempting to cross the tracks, standing alone, unsupported by other evidence, is insufficient to overcome the prima facie case arising from the presumption." (142-143.)

II.

In *Looney* v. *Metropolitan R. Co.*, 200 U. S. 480, ..., 26 S. Ct. 303, 306, 50 L. Ed. 564, this Court said:

" * * * A plaintiff in the first instance must show negligence on the part of the defendant. Having

done this, he need not go farther in those jurisdictions where the burden of proof is on the defendant to show contributory negligence. In other words, if there is no evidence which speaks one way or the other with reference to contributory negligence of the person killed, then it is presumed that there was no such negligence. Thomp. Neg. §401; *Baltimore & P. R. Co.* v. *Landrigan*, 191 U. S. 461, 48 L. Ed. 262, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137; *Texas & P. R. Co.* v. *Gentry*, 163 U. S. 353, 41 L. Ed. 186, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1104. But the negligence of a defendant cannot be inferred from a presumption of care on the part of the person killed. A presumption in the performance of duty attends the defendant as well as the person killed. It must be overcome by direct evidence. One presumption cannot be built upon another. *Douglass* v. *Mitchell*, 35 Pa. 440; *Philadelphia City Pass. R. Co.* v. *Henrice*, 92 Pa. 431, 37 Am. Rep. 699; *Yarnell* v. *Kansas City, Ft. S. & M. R. Co.*, 113 Mo. 570, 18 L. R. A. 599, 21 S. W. 1."

The majority opinion conflicts with this ruling. There was no direct evidence to overcome the presumption of due care on the part of the deceased transport driver. The majority opinion achieves its conclusion by building presumption upon presumption and by piling inference upon inference. It holds that circumstantial proof that the gasoline transport truck was upon the tracks at the time it was run into and cut in half by respondent's train showed that the deceased transport driver negligently failed to observe the headlights of the oncoming train and that he negligently failed to heed its warning whistles, and that he therefore carelessly and unlawfully failed to stop before driving upon the tracks; that he therefore carelessly and negligently and unlawfully drove the truck upon the tracks in the face of the oncoming train and at a time when it was unsafe for him to do so. We respectfully

submit that the majority opinion makes surmise and speculation, and not proof, a basis of recovery in contravention of every known rule of law.

III.

Lavendar v. *Kurn*, on which the majority opinion is based, is not applicable. There this Court held that the railroad's negligence was inferable from the physical facts and circumstances shown in evidence. This Court did not hold that such circumstances and facts overcome the presumption of due care of the deceased. That question was not in the *Lavendar* case. Moreover, *Lavendar* v. *Kurn* arose under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, and the public policy of the United States as expressed in that Act was involved. Here we deal only with rights arising under the laws of Kansas. We believe that the majority opinion misapplies and conflicts with the rule in *Lavendar* v. *Kurn*.

IV.

The majority opinion failed to follow the controlling applicable Kansas authorities and is therefore in error. *Erie R. Co.* v. *Thompkins*, 304 U. S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188.

V.

It is our humble opinion that the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals has thus decided important questions of local law in a way probably in conflict with applicable local decisions as above noted, and that good and special and important reasons, all appealing to sound judicial discretion, exist for the granting of the writ within paragraph 5(b) of Rule 38 of this Court.

Prayer.

Wherefore, your petitioner prays that a writ of certiorari be issued out of this Court directed to the Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, commanding said Court to certify and send to this Court a transcript of the record in the cases entitled Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railroad Company, and Joseph B. Fleming and Aaron Colnon, Trustees of the Estate of The Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company, appellants and cross-appellees, v. Consumers Cooperative Association, appellee and cross-appellant, Nos. 3965 and 3966, including also the proceedings in said Court, to the end that said cause may be reviewed and determined by this Court and the judgment of the Court of Appeals be reversed.

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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI.

STATEMENT OF CASE.

The facts with reference to the opinions below, the jurisdiction of this Court, the issues, the pleadings and the evidence have been sufficiently covered in the petition and will not here be repeated.

SPECIFICATION OF ERRORS TO BE URGED.

The United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit erred:

1. In holding that plaintiff's circumstantial evidence was sufficient to overcome the presumption of due care, compliance with law and love of life which the law indulges in favor of the deceased transport driver.

2. In holding that plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove the allegations of negligence made in the complaint.

3. In failing to apply the controlling Kansas authorities under which it must be held that plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence was insufficient to destroy the presumption of due care, compliance with law and love of life on the part of the deceased driver, and insufficient to prove negligence of the defendant.

ARGUMENT.

I.

Plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence was insufficient to destroy the presumption of due care, compliance with law and love of life of the deceased transport driver.

The basis of plaintiffs' claims against the defendant is that its deceased driver was negligent in driving the transport onto the tracks in the face of an oncoming train. The only known eyewitnesses to the collision, the driver of the transport truck and plaintiffs' engineer and fireman, were all killed. No one knows when the gasoline transport went upon the tracks. Certainly plaintiffs' evidence makes no such showing. With the driver dead, the law presumes that he exercised due care in driving upon the tracks and that he was exercising due care at the moment of death. *Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.* v. *Hinds,* 56 Kan. 758, 44 P. 993; *Kansas City-Leavenworth Railroad Co.* v. *Gallagher,* 68 Kan. 424, 75 P. 469, 64 L. R. A. 344; *Eidson* v. *Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co.,* 85 Kan. 329, 116 P. 485; *Smith* v. *Bassett,* 159 Kan. 128, 152 P. (2d) 794; *Henderson* v. *National Mutual Casualty Co.,* 164 Kan. 109, 187 P. (2d) 508.

In *Smith* v. *Bassett,* 159 Kan. 128, 134, 152 P. (2d) 749, the Court said:

> " * * * Ordinarily the presumption is that a person with love of life, common to all, exercises such due care as the circumstances permit to protect himself from injury (*Eidson* v. *Railway Co.,* 85 Kan. 329, 116 Pac. 485; *Sams* v. *Commercial Standards Ins. Co.,* 157 Kan. 278, 284, 139 P. (2d) 859). In view of this presumption and the lack of evidence to

clearly overcome it as a matter of law we think the motion for a directed verdict was properly overruled." (Emphasis ours.)

The Court of Appeals was in error in holding that plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence was *clearly* sufficient to overcome the presumption.

II.

Plaintiff's circumstantial evidence was insufficient to prove the allegations of negligence made in the complaint.

It is the settled law and policy of Kansas that a fact is not proven by circumstances which are merely consistent with its existence, and that while negligence may be proved by circumstantial evidence, the circumstances must point directly to the negligence of the defendant and must go further than to be merely consistent with negligence. *Canestro* v. *Joplin-Pittsburg Rld. Co.*, 135 Kan. 337, 10 P. (2d) 902; *Miller* v. *Gabbert*, 154 Kan. 260, 118 P. (2d) 523; *Goodloe* v. *Jo-Mar Dairies Co.*, 163 Kan. 611, 185 P. (2d) 158.

The complaint assigns eight specific grounds of negligence as basis for recovery (15-18). They are:

(a) That the deceased truck driver drove the transport truck upon the tracks at the same time when its train was immediately approaching and near to and upon the crossing and when the train was so close to the crossing that it could not be stopped or its speed reduced to avoid a collision with the truck.

(b) That the deceased driver drove the truck upon the track without stopping his vehicle within 50 feet but not less than 10 feet from the nearest rail, to listen and look for any approaching train before proceeding,

as required by Section 8-566, 1947 Supplement to the General Statutes of Kansas, 1935.

(c) That the deceased truck driver failed to stop, look and listen before crossing the tracks in violation of Rule XXI of the State Fire Marshal of the State of Kansas.

(d) That the deceased driver went upon the tracks without heeding the railroad warning signs and without stopping, or that if he stopped he failed to look for and see plaintiffs' train which was near, but drove the vehicle upon the tracks in front of the train.

(e) That the deceased driver failed to look for trains, or seeing the same, failed to stop in a place of safety.

(f) That the deceased truck driver failed to look for the headlight of the train, or having looked, failed to observe the lights but drove upon the track ahead of the train.

(g) That if the deceased driver had kept a lookout for the approaching train, he could and would have seen the headlight and would have seen the train approaching, and could and should have heard the blasts of the whistle, and that he negligently did not see or discover the approach of the train, or if seeing the train he did not stop the truck before entering upon the track and was negligent in proceeding upon the track in front of the approaching train.

We most respectfully urge that while the circumstantial evidence adduced by the plaintiffs might be consistent with plaintiffs' allegations of specific negligence, yet the evidence upon which plaintiffs rely was no more than merely consistent with plaintiffs' theory, and did not go beyond that point, and that same circumstantial evidence does not exclude the equally plausible hypotheses that the truck was driven upon the tracks when it was safe to do so, and that for some unexplained reason it was still upon the tracks when the train approached.

In *Miller* v. *Gabbert*, 154 Kan. 260, 266, 118 P. (2d) 523, the Court said:

> "While negligence may be proved by circumstantial evidence (*Brown* v. *Clark*, 152 Kan. 274, 103 P. (2d) 907), the circumstance must point directly to negligence of the defendant, they must go further than to be merely consistent with negligence."

In *Lukens* v. *Kellogg*, 127 Kan. 568, 274 Pac. 225, the Court held that a theory cannot be said to be established by circumstantial evidence unless the facts relied upon are of such a nature and are so related to each other that it is the only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn from them, and that it is not sufficient that they be consistent merely with that theory; that liability cannot be based on bare guess, nor can a verdict rest on mere conjecture and that probabilities and plausible conjecture are not evidence.

We respectfully submit that plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence made for no more than probability and plausible conjecture, that plaintiffs did not produce sufficient evidence to entitle them to go to the jury on the issue of defendant's negligence. We believe that the trial court properly sustained our motion for a directed verdict because of plaintiffs' failure to come forward with proof establishing its case under the Kansas authorities. We believe that Judge Huxman's dissenting opinion correctly states the law of Kansas, and we respectfully refer this Court to the many authorities cited therein.

We respectfully submit that plaintiffs' evidence furnishes only surmise and speculation as a basis for recovery. Unless one relies on surmise and speculation there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached. This record affords no evidentiary

basis of defendant's negligence. Plaintiffs' case cannot be made without proof that the deceased truck driver was negligent, thus overcoming the legal presumption indulged in his favor. Since plaintiffs' evidence has not overcome those legal presumptions, they are without probative proof of any negligence of this defendant.

III.

The Court of Appeals was in error in failing to decide this case under the controlling Kansas authorities.

In *Erie R. Co.* v. *Tompkins,* 304 U. S. 64, 78, 58 So. Ct. 817, 822, 82 L. Ed. 1188, this Court said:

> "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state. And whether the law of the state shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal courts."

We respectfully submit that the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals, in ruling our case, erroneously rested its opinion on a misconception of the holding of this Court in *Lavendar* v. *Kurn, supra,* and that it erroneously failed to apply or follow the law of Kansas so clearly defined in the cases to which we have called attention above. We respectfully urge that the majority opinion be reversed. Unless it is reversed mere surmise and conjecture become a basis of recovery in contravention of the firmly established rule, not only of the Courts of Kansas, but of this Court as well.

We challenge the respondents to show how the following questions can be answered, on the record, without resort to surmise and speculation based on presumption built on presumption and inference piled on inference:

1. Did the transport come to a complete stop before going upon the tracks?

2. Did the transport driver look and listen for the approach of the train before starting across the tracks?

3. Where was the train at the time the transport truck went upon the tracks?

4. How long was the transport truck on the tracks before it was struck?

We respectfully submit that the record furnishes no facts from which the answers to these questions can be drawn. Nor are the answers to these questions to be found in the majority opinion.

Conclusion.

Because of the great, general importance of the questions presented, your petitioner respectfully prays that its petition for a writ of certiorari be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX.

Rule XXI of the State Fire Marshal of Kansas:

"Crossing Railway Tracks. Every vehicle transporting inflammable liquids by means of the public highways of this state shall, before passing over any railway or railroad tracks, except street railways within boundaries of incorporated cities or towns, be brought to a complete stop immediately and not proceed thereover until it is safe to do so. (Effective Jan. 1, 1936.)" (16)

Sec. 8-566, 1947 Supplement to the General Statutes of Kansas, 1935:

"Certain vehicles must stop at all railroad grade crossings. (a) The driver of any motor vehicle carrying passengers for hire, or of any school bus carrying any school child, or of any vehicle carrying explosive substances or flammable liquids as a cargo or part of a cargo, before crossing at grade any track or tracks of a railroad, shall stop such vehicle within fifty feet but not less than ten feet from the nearest rail of such railroad, and while so stopped shall listen and look in both directions along such track for any approaching train, and for signals indicating the approach of a train, except as hereinafter provided, and shall not proceed until he can do so safely. (b) No stop need be made at any such crossing where a police officer or a traffic-control signal directs traffic to proceed. (c) This section shall not apply at street railway grade crossings within a business or residence district." (16)

No. 84

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IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM 1949

CONSUMERS COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION,
PETITIONER,

vs.

CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, AND JOSEPH B. FLEMING AND AARON COLNON, Trustees of the Estate of the Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific Railway Company,
RESPONDENTS.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS ON PLAINTIFF'S PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, TENTH CIRCUIT.

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INDEX.

	Page
Questions Presented	1
Jurisdiction and Reasons for Writ	2
Argument	8
Conclusion	17

TABLE OF CASES.

Berry v. Dewey, 102 Kan. 392, 170 Pac. 1000 6

Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 274 U. S. 543, 47 S. Ct. 663, 71 L. Ed. 1193 17

Gaffney v. Railway Co., 107 Kan. 486, 192 Pac. 736 .. 16
Gilbert v. Railway Co., 109 Kan. 107, 197 Pac. 872 .. 15
Goodloe v. Jo-Mar Dairies Co., 163 Kan. 611, 621, 185 Pac. 2d 158 13

Holman v. Railway Co., 113 Kan. 710, 215 Pac. 1111 15

Lukens v. Kellogg, 127 Kan. 568, 274 Pac. 225 .....10, 11

Magnum Import Co., v. Coty, 262 U. S. 159, 43 S. Ct. 531, 67 L. Ed. 922 17
Miller v. Gabbert, 154 Kan. 260, 266, 118 P. 2d 523 ..10, 11

Ogden v. Wilson, 120 Kan. 269, 243 Pac. 284 14

Pagan v. Lowden, 145 Kan. 513, 66 P. 2d 567 14

Railway Co. v. Wood, 66 Kan. 613, 72 Pac. 215 11
Rathbone v. Railway Co., 113 Kan. 257, 214 Pac. 109 14
Rierson v. Southern Kansas Stage Lines Co., 146 Kan. 30, 69 P. 2d 1 12
Rogers v. Burden & Co., 137 F. 2d 284 C. C. A. 10 ... 6

Sawhill v. Casualty Reciprocal Exchange, 152 Kan. 735, 107 P. 2d 770 16
Smith v. Bassett, 159 Kan. 128, 134, 152 P. 2d 749 ...5, 10
Supica et al. v. Armour & Co., 131 Kan. 756, 758, 293 Pac. 483 12

U. S. v. Johnson, 268 U. S. 220, 45 S. Ct. 496, 69 L. Ed. 925 17